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Although discretion among employees at organizations' lower levels seems to be increasing, it is 
uncertain whether this is a desirable HRM policy. To understand this issue better, this study tests 
competing organization theory predictions about the performance consequences of middle 
managers' perceived discretion. Discretion is defined as the freedom of action or decision 
authority available in managing subordinates. Survey data from a multinational, European 
sample of research and development (R&D) units were used to assess the effect of managers' 
perceived discretion on unit performance. The results show that a combination of ecology theory 
and strategic choice theory best predicts the relationship between discretion and unit 
performance. Greater perceived managerial discretion was linked to increased unit performance 
in a relationship moderated by managerial experience and limited by unit size. These findings 
have implications for HRM theory and practice, particularly regarding policies related to 
empowerment and leadership development. 
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The idea of a flat or flexible organization is well established in the larger business community 
and popular press (Coulson-Thomas & Coe, 1991; Dastmalchian & Blyton, 1998). Flat 
organizations increase the discretion of lower-level managers and line employees by simplifying 
the organization’s structure, reducing hierarchy, and minimizing rules to provide more freedom 
and control at work (Joyce, 2005). Many observers have credited increased discretion in flat 
organizations with a range of desirable outcomes, including agility, creativity, initiative, 
responsiveness, speed, innovation, and knowledge creation (e.g., Aghion & Tirole, 1997; Chow, 
1998; Mathieu, Gilson, & Ruddy, 2006; Perry, 1995; Svelby, 1992). Indeed, it has been 
suggested that flat organizing is inevitable, that it will become the dominant organizational form, 
and that lower-level managers are therefore the leaders of the future (Malone, 2004). 
 
Flat organizing is familiar to HRM practitioners. It is typically implemented through 
empowerment practices that increase discretion at lower levels by shifting responsibility and 
influence down the hierarchy (Mathieu et al., 2006; Wood & Wall, 2007). This includes practices 
such as high-involvement work systems and other forms of employee participation (e.g., 
Ciavarella, 2003; Lawler, 1992; Pfeffer, 1998; Shih, Chiang, & Hsu, 2006). Moreover, consistent 
with the positive outcomes the general business community attributes to flat organizing, research 
has linked HRM practices on empowerment and participation repeatedly with gains in employee 
attitudes and subsequent performance (e.g., Alge, Ballinger, Tangirala, & Oakley, 2006; Guthrie, 
2001; Kirkman & Rosen, 1999; Peccei & Rosenthal, 2001; Vlachos, 2008). In fact, a recent 
meta-analysis of empowering HRM practices found strong positive relationships with 
performance (Subramony, 2009). 
 
On the surface, these arguments seem to suggest that increased discretion for all employees is an 
HRM policy that all organizations should pursue. The situation may not be that straightforward, 
however, for several reasons. First, most traditional HRM practices are based on an assumption 
of function-based departments and vertical authority (Jackson & Schuler, 1999; van Sluijs, can 
Assen, & den Hartog, 1991), which could lead to issues of misfit between existing policies and 
increased discretion (Lengnick-Hall, Lengnick-Hall, Andrade, & Drake, 2009; Werbel & 
DeMarie, 2005). Second, and even more important, there is reason to question the value of 
maximizing employee discretion (e.g., Lee, 1998). The benefits revealed in previous research 
typically contrast some discretion with none and do not address the matter of how much 
discretion to provide or when it will be most beneficial; there may be limits to the gains realized 
from increasing discretion. HRM policy, therefore, needs an informed perspective to use in 
judging how much discretion is appropriate. 
 
These concerns are especially true of middle managers, whose position of relative authority gives 
their discretionary actions more influence than those of front line workers. Consistent with this 
thought, some researchers have expressed skepticism about flattened hierarchy (e.g., Gittell, 
2000), and evidence suggests that simply providing more discretion does not necessarily produce 
benefits (Maynard, Mathieu, Marsh, & Ruddy, 2007). Further, many employees in recently 
flattened hierarchies appear to be unhappy with the change. Anecdotal reports suggest that 
middle managers often make poor use of the increased discretion that the flattening provides 
(e.g., Heuer, 2003; Kruger, 1996; Sinofsky, 2005). Given these dissenting views, it is not clear 
how much benefit organizations should expect from increasing the discretion of middle 
managers. 
 
Unfortunately, organization theory is also ambivalent about the effects of increased managerial 
discretion; therefore, it does not offer clear guidance for HRM. Research evidence has clearly 
shown that discretion benefits the individuals who have it, because discretion has been linked to 
improved well-being, physical health, and job satisfaction (e.g., Conte, Dean, Ringenbach, 
Moran, & Landy, 2005; Ganster, 1989; Karasek, 1990). It is less clear, however, under what 
conditions increased discretion creates performance benefits beyond those to the recipient 
(however, see Rank, Carsten, Unger, & Spector, 2007). In fact, key organizational theories make 
conflicting predictions on this issue. Ecology theory suggests that managerial discretion is 
irrelevant to organizational performance; agency theory predicts that managerial discretion may 
reduce performance; and strategic choice theory presumes that managerial discretion can 
increase performance. While these are simplified statements of complex theoretical positions, 
they highlight organization theory’s equivocality about the performance implications of 
managerial discretion. Current theory simply does not provide consistent guidance for HRM 
decisions about choosing the appropriate level of discretion for middle managers. 
 
To help resolve this issue, this study tests the conflicting predictions of ecology, agency, and 
strategic choice theories about the performance consequences of middle managers’ discretion. 
This is consistent with the recommended approach of using established organization theory 
perspectives to understand HRM outcomes (Watson, 2007; Wright & McMahan, 1999). This 
study follows the recommended best practice of using multiple theoretical lenses to maximize 
explanatory power (Jackson & Schuler, 1999; Watson, 2007). The result integrates these 
theoretical lenses to provide guidance for HRM decisions about how much discretion to give to 
middle managers. 
 
Perceived Managerial Discretion 
 
Discretion is the freedom of action available to an individual (March & Simon, 1958; 
Williamson, 1963). Managerial discretion, therefore, is managers’ freedom to manage in the way 
that they deem most appropriate (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). For middle managers, 
discretion is the latitude of action or freedom of choice available when establishing the unit’s 
work (see Simon, 1951). For example, consider a manager whose actions are monitored closely 
and often overruled by organizational superiors. This individual has little discretion, particularly 
compared to a manager who is mostly unsupervised. Similarly, a manager who must satisfy 
lengthy and detailed requirements has relatively little discretion compared to a manager who is 
given only vague goals and complete freedom in pursuing them. In simplest terms, managerial 
discretion is the degree of freedom managers have in doing their work. When managers have 
both formal and practical control over their own and their subordinates’ work, they have high 
discretion (see Aghion & Tirole, 1997). 
 
This paper focuses on perceived managerial discretion, as distinct from objective managerial 
discretion. Most prior work has focused on objective managerial discretion, especially as derived 
from formal organizational structures and industry characteristics (e.g., Dobbin & Boychuk, 
1999; Hambrick & Abrahamson, 1995; Hendrickson & Harrison, 1998; Magnan & St-Onge, 
1997; Olk & Elvira, 2001; Perrone, Zaheer, & McEvily, 2003; Shalley, 1991; Zohar & Luria, 
2005). This previous research has explained how structural and environmental features offer 
varying levels of discretion to managers. For example, the long-term investment required in 
capital-intensive industries tends to limit managerial discretion, while industry growth provides a 
munificent environment and greater discretion (Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998). 
 
All managers, however, do not respond identically to a given environment; indeed, individual 
perception mediates the effect of objective discretion. For example, imagine a hypothetical 
industry and organization that provide enormous discretion to managers, allowing them to pursue 
a range of possibilities. In this situation, if a particular manager fails to recognize this freedom, 
then his or her behavior will not reflect the objective discretion available. Likewise, a manager 
who perceives more discretion than is actually available may waste organizational resources on 
fruitless efforts. This is consistent with the basic assumption that employee perceptions and 
responses link HRM practices and behavioral outcomes (Boselie, Dietz, & Boon, 2005). 
Moreover, the mediating role of perception is supported by research evidence showing perceived 
discretion to be the better predictor of managerial behavior (Carpenter & Golden, 1997). 
Research on employee job control has likewise shown that perceived control is more closely 
related to behavior than is objective control (Ganster, 1989). 
 
As such, this study examined the effect of perceived managerial discretion on unit performance. 
In doing so, it contributes at the border between micro and strategic HRM (Boxall, Purcell, & 
Wright, 2007). Examining how an individual manager’s perception of the organizational context 
influences unit-level performance provides a link between individuals and collectives (Tichy, 
Fombrun, & Devanna, 1982). 
 
Theoretical Paradigms and Hypotheses 
 
Perceived Managerial Discretion and Performance 
 
Ecology theory, agency theory, and strategic choice theory advance conflicting predictions about 
the effect of perceived managerial discretion on unit performance. The conflict arises from 
different assumptions about managers’ efficacy and motivation. This section summarizes each 
theoretical perspective, with its assumptions and resulting prediction, and then describes several 
moderators that the theories suggest will influence the relationship between discretion and 
performance (see Table I). 
 
Table I. Summary of Theoretical Paradigms 
Theoretical Lens Ecology Theory Agency Theory Strategic Choice Theory 
Assumption about 
managerial efficacy 
Limited: Managers cannot 
have consistent effects on 
organizational outcomes. 
Managers can and do 
influence organizational 
outcomes. 







managers are assumed to 
have limited effects, 
regardless of motivation. 
Managers have self-serving 
motivations, such that 
discretion may be used to 
subvert organizational goals. 
Managers have organization-
oriented motivations and will 




None. Reduced performance. Increased performance. 
Special 
considerations 
Organizational age and unit 
size each influence both 
performance and discretion, 
creating the illusion of a 
relationship between 
discretion and performance. 
Functionally similar units 
and organizational 
commitment each reduce the 
threat of managers’ misusing 
discretion. 
Education and experience 
increase the benefits from 
discretion. 
HRM implication Primary HRM function is to 
align internal structures for 
fit with environmental 
demands. 
Primary functions of HRM 
are to (1) create incentives 
that reduce opportunism and 
(2) provide information to 
reduce asymmetry. 
Primary function of HRM is 
to recruit and develop 
appropriate human capital to 




Ecological theories of organization explain changes in organizational populations by applying 
the logic of evolution and natural selection to organizational phenomena (Baum, 1996; Singh & 
Lumsden, 1990). While these theories are concerned primarily with diversity in organizational 
populations, they are premised on strong assumptions about managerial efficacy and, by 
implication, the link between managerial action and performance. Although ecology theory is not 
typically mentioned in discussions of HRM-relevant frameworks (e.g., Wright & McMahan, 
1999), this theoretical paradigm has been shown to provide useful insights into HRM processes 
(e.g., Boyne & Meier, 2008; Gong & Chang, 2008; Welbourne & Andrews, 1996). The 
ecological metaphor is particularly useful as a way to think rigorously about the internal 
organizational environment in which HRM practices act (Boyne & Meier, 2008; Jackson & 
Schuler, 1995).  
 
An important commonality among the variants of ecology theory is the assumption that 
intentional managerial action is relatively unimportant. Some ecological theories treat 
organizations as inert, precluding managerial influence (e.g., Hannan & Freeman, 1977). Others 
hold that managers might create change in organizations but assume that such changes are either 
a deterministic result of structural forces or of limited benefit to the organization (Carroll, 1988; 
Hannan & Freeman, 1984). The common theme is that external or structural forces are so 
powerful that managers cannot possibly have any systematic effect on organizations (e.g., Gong 
& Chang, 2008; Welbourne & Andrews, 1996). Ecology theory therefore assumes that 
intentional managerial action is impossible, externally determined, or effectively no better than 
random variation. Given this theoretical paradigm, there should be no consistent relationship 
between managerial discretion and performance. Thus: 
 




Where ecology theory understands organizations through an analogy to biological life, agency 
theory treats an organization as a system of contracts among individuals. Owners and investors 
(principals) delegate authority to managers (agents), who act on their behalf (Fama, 1980; Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976). The agency theory perspective has been highly influential in economic and 
organizational studies (e.g., Aghion & Tirole, 1997; Ghoshal, 2005; Shapiro, 2005) and has been 
recognized as a potentially valuable perspective for HRM research (e.g., Jackson & Schuler, 
1999; Wright & McMahan, 1999). Despite this, a recent review was unable to identify any 
HRM-focused empirical studies assessing agency theory (Boselie et al., 2005), although one 
early working paper demonstrated the value of agency theory, finding support for several of its 
HRM-related predictions (Welbourne & Cyr, 1996). 
 
Regarding the issue of managerial discretion, agency theory posits that principals need to be 
highly concerned with how agents act, because agents are likely to have personal interests that 
conflict with those of the principals (Bottom, Holloway, Miller, Mislin, & Whitford, 2006). 
These personal interests cause agents to use their discretion to pursue personal goals, rather than 
the principals’ or organizations’ goals (Kiser, 1999). In other words, agency theory assumes that 
the more discretion managers have, the more they can divert organizational resources away from 
performance toward personal goals. Managerial discretion should therefore reduce performance. 
Thus: 
 
Hypothesis 1b: Perceived managerial discretion reduces unit performance. 
 
Strategic Choice Theory 
 
Like agency theory, strategic choice theory assumes that managers can create meaningful change 
in organizations. Where agency theory assumes managers will use this power for personal gain at 
the expense of the organization, strategic choice theory assumes that managers will use 
discretion to benefit the organization (Child, 1972; Hrebiniak, 1974; Keats & Hitt, 1988). This 
perspective has dominated HRM research and is premised on the assumption that well-prepared 
managers will make situationally appropriate responses to the dynamic challenges that arise 
during organizational operations (Boselie et al., 2005; Capelli & Singh, 1992; Jackson, Schuler, 
& Rivero, 1989; Wright & Snell, 1998). 
 
In contrast to agency theory, which traditionally does not recognize organizations as entities in 
themselves (Fama, 1980), strategic choice theory considers the importance of issues such as 
promotion opportunity, organizational commitment, and job dependence, all of which can 
motivate managers to act on behalf of the organization. A manager’s fate is tied to the 
organization’s fate if no other job prospects are available. Likewise, benefiting the organization 
can lead to promotions that benefit the manager. Such considerations lead strategic choice theory 
to predict that managers want their organizations to succeed. As such, managerial discretion 
should increase performance by allowing managers to adjust to changes in a dynamic 
environment (Dastmalchian & Blyton, 1998; Lepak, Marrone, & Takeuchi, 2004; Marlin, 
Lamont, & Hoffman, 1994). Thus: 
 
Hypothesis 1c: Perceived managerial discretion increases unit performance. 
 
Moderators of Discretion’s Effect 
 
The three alternate versions of Hypothesis 1 are relatively simplistic. While each theory rests on 
basic assumptions about managerial behavior, each theory also qualifies its assumptions with 
significant contingencies. These contingencies lead to several important moderators, described in 
this section. Although tests of moderating effects are relatively rare in HRM studies (Boselie et 
al., 2005), such interactions are essential to accurately test the theories in question and 




A fair test of ecology theory requires controlling for potential spurious correlations between 
managerial discretion and unit performance. Ecology theory predicts that discretion has no effect 
on performance, but other factors might simultaneously influence both discretion and 
performance. Organizational age is one such factor (Boselie et al., 2005). Age has consistently 
been found to predict organizational success and survival (Freeman, 1984). Newness has several 
disadvantages: the time spent learning and creating routines is directed away from immediately 
productive behavior (Stinchcombe, 1965); social networks have yet to be established so one must 
rely on the goodwill of strangers (Freeman, Carroll, & Hannan, 1983); and newness precludes 
having a reputation for reliability and predictability, which are preferentially selected for by the 
environment (Hannan & Freeman, 1984). These disadvantages combine to make newness a 
significant liability. At the same time, the lack of routines and formal procedure associated with 
newness could increase managerial discretion, because formal structure has been shown to 
reduce freedom (Zohar & Luria, 2005). As a result, age should predict both increased 
performance and decreased discretion. Thus: 
 
Hypothesis 2a: Organizational age increases unit performance. 
 





Another important ecological effect is the liability of smallness (Boselie et al., 2005; Singh & 
Lumsden, 1990). Smaller size typically means fewer resources. It is also more difficult for small 
entities to take advantage of economies of scale. In contrast, large size supports the routines and 
predictability that environmental selection favors (Baum, 1996). Smallness therefore increases 
the likelihood of failure. At the same time, the lack of routines associated with smallness and the 
reduced inertia associated with smaller groups could lead to greater managerial discretion (Gong 
& Chang, 2008; Tushman & Romanelli, 1985; Welbourne & Andrews, 1996; Zohar & Luria, 
2005). Thus: 
 
Hypothesis 3a: Unit size increases unit performance. 
 
Hypothesis 3b: Unit size is negatively associated with perceived managerial discretion. 
 
Functionally Similar Units 
 
As with ecology theory, there are important moderators that apply to agency theory. Agency 
theory predicts that discretion reduces performance, but this is only true when agents act 
opportunistically. For this study, the most important source of opportunism is information 
asymmetry; managers may take advantage of their greater knowledge of operational details and 
their control over the flow of relevant information to pursue their own interests (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Levinthal, 1988). If the principal is able to acquire information that reduces this 
asymmetry, however, the principal can prevent the misuse of organizational resources (Fama, 
1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983). With regard to middle managers supervising intra-organizational 
units, the most relevant source of information for principals would be functionally similar units 
(Wright & McMahan, 1999). If many managers and units are performing a task, they can provide 
principals with information and knowledgeable assessment (Jones & Wright, 1992). Consistent 
with this, previous work has shown that the presence of other agents improves the efficiency of 
the principal-agent relationship (Levinthal, 1988). Thus: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Functionally similar units reduce the negative effect of perceived managerial 




An important source of agent opportunism is the presumed difference between personal and 
organizational goals (Fama, 1980; Levinthal, 1988). An extreme example would be a manager 
who is more concerned with having a large office and an easy work schedule than with the unit’s 
performance. In such a situation, managerial discretion would reduce performance. If the 
principal and agent share common interests, however, then discretion need not be harmful; the 
agent is motivated to act as the principal desires (e.g., Welbourne & Cyr, 1996). An important 
source of such alignment is organizational commitment (Cook & Wall, 1980; Meyer, Becker, & 
Vandenberghe, 2004). If a manager is committed to pursuing organizational goals, discretion 
should not reduce performance. Thus: 
 
Hypothesis 5: A manager’s commitment to the organization reduces the negative effect of 




The key contingency of strategic choice theory is the manager’s ability to use discretion 
effectively. Giving a manager more freedom allows his or her unique experiences, perspectives, 
and management style to have more influence on outcomes (e.g., Paauwe & Boselie, 2005). 
Therefore, even if it is generally true that increased discretion benefits performance, the extent of 
the benefit will vary by manager. How a manager uses discretion determines its effect on 
performance (Bass, Avolio, Jung, & Berson, 2003; Peterson, Smith, Martorana, & Owens, 2003). 
One would expect a talented, skilled manager to use discretion for greater benefit than would a 
manager with less ability. It is for this reason that HRM practice stresses the need to have the 
right people implementing strategy (Carbrera & Bonache, 1999; Wright & Snell, 1991) and why 
high-performance work systems place so much emphasis on focused recruitment and training 
(Huselid, 1995; Shih et al., 2006). Thus: 
 
Hypothesis 6: A manager’s education increases the positive effect of perceived managerial 
discretion on unit performance. 
 
Hypothesis 7: A manager’s experience increases the positive effect of perceived managerial 
discretion on unit performance. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the hypotheses and their relationships based on each theoretical lens. As this 
figure shows, current organization theory offers conflicting advice about the optimal level of 
discretion for middle managers. To advance HRM practice and theory, these competing 
hypotheses were tested in a multinational sample of unit managers. 
 
 
Figure 1. Summary of competing hypotheses concerning the effect of middle managers’ 






This paper used data from the International Comparative Study on the Organization and 
Performance of Research Units (Knorr et al., 1999). This was a large-scale survey project 
initiated by six European countries and conducted by the Secretariat of the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). UNESCO is a specialized agency 
of the United Nations that is responsible for collecting and sharing information. The International 
Comparative Study was undertaken to help the participating national governments understand 
the organization and performance of scientific research in their countries. 
 
In each country, a research team administered standardized questionnaires to a representative 
sample of approximately 200 research and development (R&D) units. All units met three criteria 
for participation: (1) they had a manager who was a participating member; (2) they had at least 
three members in regular communication with one another; and (3) they had an expected 
duration of at least one year. The final sample included responses from 1,222 units in nine 
different scientific fields. 
 
This paper used a subset of this data based on four conditions. First, the subset included only five 
scientific fields (chemistry, 25%; life sciences, 22%; agriculture, 14%; technology, 31%; and 
medical science, 8%). The other four fields had few responses and limited distribution among 
countries. Second, the selected units were all semi-autonomous units within larger organizations 
(i.e., independent and inter-organizational units were excluded). There were five types of larger 
organizations: universities (39%); university-affiliated research centers (11%); non profit or 
public service organizations (25%); commercial enterprises (19%); and federal or state research 
bodies (6%). Third, the subset included only units with an external superior who was familiar 
with the unit’s work. Finally, each unit was from a different organization (i.e., units were 
independent). The resulting sample consisted of 718 units, drawn from all six countries: Hungary 









Unit performance was measured with four items, one each concerning innovation, quality, 
success in reaching R&D goals, and contribution to the scientific field. The organizational 
superior responsible for evaluating the unit’s performance provided these ratings. Details of the 
exact relationship between evaluator and unit were not specified and presumably varied by unit 
and organization type. Unit managers, however, indicated whether they felt the evaluator in 
question was familiar with the work of the unit. To ensure the validity of the performance 
measure, the analysis described here included only units where the manager indicated good 
familiarity on the part of the evaluator. 
 
Perceived Managerial Discretion 
 
Managers rated their freedom and control in four areas (one item each): use of training resources, 
hiring, firing, and assigning specific tasks in the unit. Managers reporting greater control in these 
areas were assumed to perceive themselves as having more discretion. For example, consider 
assigning unit tasks. If managers feel free to determine which tasks subordinates undertake, then 





Managers reported the age of their organization in years. A logarithmic transformation was used 




Each manager reported how many scientists he or she supervised in the unit. This number was 
log-transformed to reduce positive skew. 
 
Number of Functionally Similar Units 
 
Managers reported the number of units in the organization that performed “the same or similar” 
work. To reduce positive skew in the distribution, the analysis used a square-root transformation 
of the reported counts. 
 
Manager’s Commitment to the Organization 
 
Organizational commitment was measured by reverse scoring a single item about the manager’s 
intention to leave the unit. Responses ranged from “I rarely ever consider leaving” to “I would 
leave if I had a suitable opportunity” using a 5-point scale. Reverse scoring created a measure of 
the manager’s intention to stay. While this measure fails to distinguish the nature of the 
organizational commitment (i.e., affective, continuance, or normative; Meyer & Allen, 1997), it 
does reflect the extent to which managers consider their fate is entwined with the organization 




Managers reported their years of full-time equivalent education, including post-graduate work 
and their total years of R&D experience, as measures of education and experience, respectively. 
It should be noted that these measures assess scientific expertise. The data did not indicate their 




The data had many missing values; only 489 cases (68%) had complete data. The largest missing 
data rate for any one variable, however, was only 11% (rates of missing data are listed in Table 
II). Such cases of missing data are best addressed through multiple imputation (see Schafer, 
1999, for an overview), rather than case deletion or mean substitution (Schafer & Olsen, 1998). 
Simulation studies have shown that deletion and mean substitution often generate biased, 
inefficient estimators (Little & Rubin, 1987; Wothke, 2000). The results in this paper were 
derived by aggregating 10 imputed data sets (see Schafer & Olsen, 1998). 
 
Analysis was conducted using maximum likelihood structural equation modeling (SEM). The 
common moderation-testing approach of using multiple group comparisons was unworkable, 
however, because of the need to test four continuous moderators simultaneously (Raykov & 
Marcoulides, 2000). Therefore, the approach suggested by Ping (1995), which allowed 




Table II provides descriptive statistics for all variables. Analysis began by confirming the 
convergent and discriminant validity of the measures (Kline, 1998). Beta coefficients between 
latent factors and their indicators were all .5 or greater; the absolute values of correlations among 
latent factors were all less than .3; and the model fit with the data was moderate (χ2 81 = 318.58; 
χ/df = 3.93; SRMR = .08; CFI = .89; RMSEA = .06), based on Hu and Bentler’s (1999) 
combinatorial criteria. 
 
Table II. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 %Missing 
1. Unit performance 15.94 2.21 (.87)       0.3 
2. Perceived managerial discretion 16.12 3.53 .07 (.71)      8.5 
3. Organization age 91.35 130.66 .03 .19*      2.4 
4. Unit size 7.50 11.29 .07 .12* –.02     2.9 
5. Functionally similar units 1.70 3.22 .01 –.07 –.05 –.05    4.2 
6. Manager’s commitment 4.22 1.07 .00 .23* .09* –.03 .02   1.7 
7. Manager’s education 19.86 3.45 –.01 .07 .03 .00 –.01 –.01  11.1 
8. Manager’s experience 19.49 9.45 .06 .16* .14* .19* .05 .24* .11* 0.7 
Notes: N = 718; Cronbach’s alpha on diagonal.*p < .05 
 
The next stage of analysis fit the theorized structural model with moderation terms and all direct 
paths. Based on modification indexes, a correlation was added between the 
discretion*commitment and discretion*experience moderation terms. This addition did not 
change any of the results or relationships among study variables, but it did increase the model’s 
fit with the data, which was acceptable (χ2 126 = 294.71; χ2/df = 2.34; SRMR = .05; CFI = .93; 
RMSEA = .04). 
 
This base model was compared to six alternative models, which included control variables for 
the unit’s scientific field, nation, or type of organization, as well as possible interaction terms 
(see Table III). For example, the first alternative model included observed predictor variables for 
each scientific field (dummy coded: chemistry yes/no, life science yes/no, etc.). The second 
alternative model included the field and field*discretion interaction terms to test whether the 
scientific field influenced the link between discretion and performance (e.g., does managerial 
discretion affect a chemistry unit’s performance differently than an agricultural unit’s?). These 
features of work context are not directly relevant to the hypotheses, but previous evidence 
suggested they could influence discretion in R&D units (e.g., Cheng, 1983; Dobbin & Boychuk, 
1999). 
 
Table III. Alternative Model Comparisons 
Model χ2(df) Δχ2*(df) χ2/df SRMR CFI RMSEA 
Base (consistent with all hypotheses) 294.71 
(126) 
 2.34 .05 .93 .04 




3.05 .06 .89 .05 




5.86 .07 .69 .08 




6.98 .09 .57 .09 




10.22 .10 .52 .11 




10.36 .11 .44 .11 




10.29 .09 .54 .11 




10.87 .10 .46 .12 
Note: *All Δχ2 p < .05 
 
Model comparisons, however, showed that the addition of work context variables did not 
improve the analysis. There were some direct effects from contextual features (e.g., medical 
units had higher average performance ratings than units in any other field, p < .05), but there 
were no significant interactions between work context and managerial discretion, and the results 
of individual hypothesis tests were substantively unchanged by including the work context 
variables. Moreover, all of the alternative models had a significantly worse fit with the data. For 
parsimony, the base model is reported here, without including work context variables. 
 
Regarding perceived managerial discretion’s direct effect on performance, the results supported 
H1a and thus failed to support H1b and H1c. There was no direct effect (p = .17) consistent with 
ecology theory prediction. The other hypotheses from ecology theory received mixed support. 
H2 was not supported. There was no association between organizational age and unit 
performance (H2a, p = .20). In addition, the significant correlation between organizational age 
and perceived managerial discretion was positive, rather than the predicted negative (H2b, r = 
.19; p < .05). In contrast, unit size did predict unit performance as hypothesized (H3a, p < .05). 
There was also a significant correlation between unit size and perceived managerial discretion, 
but it was positive, rather than the predicted negative (H3b, r = .12; p < .05). 
 
The agency theory predictions received no support. The number of functionally similar units did 
not affect the relationship between perceived managerial discretion and unit performance (H4, p 
= .43), nor was the relationship altered by managerial commitment (H5, p = .17). The 
predictions derived from strategic choice theory had mixed support. H6 was not supported; 
managerial education did not influence the link between discretion and performance (p = .78). 
Hypothesis 7, however, was supported. As predicted, managerial experience had a positive 
moderating effect on the relationship between perceived managerial discretion and unit 
performance (p < .05). 
 
All direct effects outside the hypotheses were non-significant. That is, unit performance was not 
predicted by the number of functionally similar units (p = .78), managerial commitment (p = 
.44), managerial education (p = .64), or managerial experience (p = .07). Figure 2 summarizes 
these results by presenting the significant predictors of unit performance. 
 
 
Figure 2. Summary of the factors influencing the effect of perceived managerial discretion on 
unit performance 




Popular and academic opinions seem to favor flattening organizational structures to increase the 
discretion of lower-level employees (e.g., Malone, 2004; Subramony, 2009). Nonetheless, 
reservations have been expressed about increasing discretion, particularly for middle managers 
(e.g., Gittell, 2000; Heuer, 2003). This difference of opinion suggests that important moderators 
exist in the benefits gained from increasing middle managers’ discretion, making discretion more 
effective in some situations than in others (Aghion & Tirole, 1997). This paper investigated such 
contingencies as a way to advance HRM theory and inform its practice in the current era of 
devolving authority and reduced hierarchy. 
 
The results from a multinational sample of R&D units indicate that middle managers’ perceived 
discretion does influence unit performance, but does so in a contingent manner. Managers’ 
discretion had no direct effect on performance, but there was a significant interaction between 
discretion and experience: Experienced managers who reported higher discretion also had better 
performing units. The most likely explanation of this finding is that managerial discretion 
benefits unit performance only when the manager has sufficient experience to effectively use it. 
For example, contrast two hypothetical managers of a pharmaceutical R&D unit. The first is a 
30-year veteran of multiple projects and several corporate mergers; the second is a recent 
graduate from the country’s leading PhD program. Both are capable scientists, and both are 
given great discretion by their superiors. It seems clear that the first manager, with 30 years of 
experience, will be better able to use discretion to benefit the unit. The PhD graduate, having 
limited management experience, is unlikely to use the freedom optimally. This contingent benefit 
is consistent with established relationships in previous research (Lengnick-Hall et al., 2009; 
Schuler & Jackson, 1987; Wright, Smart, & McMahan, 1995) and underscores the recognized 
need to have the right people and skills in place to pursue strategic objectives (Lepak et al., 2004; 
Wright & Snell, 1998). 
 
The results also showed that structural forces had important influences on managerial discretion. 
There were positive relationships among unit performance, unit size, and managerial discretion. 
As a result, both ecology theory and strategic choice theory are important for understanding 
discretion in organizations. Structural forces were important but did not preclude managerial 
influence. Given this, managerial discretion might be best described as effective adaptation 
within environmental constraints (e.g., Boyne & Meier, 2008). This process has been called 
differentiation to distinguish it from pure ecological selection and unfettered strategic choice 
(Hrebiniak, 1974). In terms of using established organization theories to understand HRM 
outcomes, these findings suggest that ecology theory and strategic choice are both relevant 
perspectives. In other words, both intentional and institutional factors are influential in 
determining HRM outcomes, and therefore both need to be considered when setting policy (Foss, 




An important theoretical aim of this paper was to test the competing predictions of different 
organization theories. The results showed that ecology theory had partial predictive success. The 
liability of smallness was observed, but there was no liability of newness. This is consistent with 
previous unit-level examinations of ecology theory, which also found that the liability of 
newness did not apply to intra-organizational units (Usher & Evans, 1996). This pattern may 
indicate that age is not useful as a proxy measure for intra-organizational processes. The liability 
of newness derives from lack of established routines, lack of social network connections, and 
lack of reputation, with organizational age having been shown to correlate with these at an 
organizational level. When making a more fine-grained analysis of intra-organizational units, 
however, age may be too crude a measure. For example, if a new unit is composed of the most 
established experts in the organization, it will immediately have network connections and 
reputation, and perhaps even routines (see Bettenhausen & Murninghan, 1985). In this case, 
organization age and unit age would both be poor measures. Instead, investigations of ecology 
theory would need to assess the underlying issues directly (e.g., presence of routines, network 
connections). Further research is required to confirm this, but it suggests how ecology theory 
may need to be modified when applied to intra-organizational units. 
 
Strategic choice theory also had mixed predictive success. The data confirmed the importance of 
managerial experience, but there was no relationship, direct or moderated, between managerial 
education and unit performance. This might suggest that practical experience is more important 
than formal training when managers exercise discretion (e.g., Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986). An 
equally likely explanation, however, is that the sample lacked sufficient variance. Almost all 
managers had advanced graduate degrees; the mean was more than 19 years of formal education. 
Beyond a certain point, however, more years of schooling may provide little performance 
benefit. Examining the education-discretion-performance relationship in a more educationally 
diverse population could resolve this matter. It would also be useful to include a measure of 
management-specific education (e.g., MBA degree). 
 
In contrast to the mixed success of ecology theory and strategic choice theory, the agency theory 
predictions received no support. One explanation may arise from the assumption of opportunism: 
The agency theory predictions only apply to managers who would exhibit selfish or shirking 
behavior. Doubts about the assumption of opportunism are not new (Bottom et al., 2006; Perrow, 
1986) but seem worth restating, given the cultural and intellectual dominance of agency theory 
(Zajac & Westphal, 2004). As an analytic tool, agency theory has generated many useful insights 
(Shapiro, 2005), but the results presented here question its utility as an explanatory theory of 
unit-level outcomes (also see Ghoshal, 2005). 
 
An alternate interpretation would be that these results are unique to the particular research 
context for numerous reasons. Although early statements of agency theory stressed that its 
predictions apply at all levels (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), it has since been described as most 
useful for senior management (Jackson & Schuler, 1999). Agency theory may simply be less 
useful when considering middle managers. The second consideration is the unique nature of 
R&D work. The uncertain and creative task of R&D could combine with the incumbents’ high 
levels of skill and education to create intrinsic motivation (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996). In other 
words, R&D work may be inherently interesting enough to counter agent opportunism. 
Similarly, because of the nature of R&D work, it may be that principal control is not desirable. 
Previous investigations have noted the inherent trade-off between principals’ control and agents’ 
initiative (Aghion & Tirole, 1997), and the results here may reflect the fact that the best R&D 
results are achieved when principals cede their control to maximize agent initiative and 
creativity. For these reasons, it remains to be seen whether the observed failure of agency theory 
to explain unit outcomes generalizes to other work domains. 
 
This paper also extended ecology theory, agency theory, and strategic choice theory through its 
use of European data. Fears have been expressed about the predominance of North American 
data sources in organization science (e.g., Palmer, 2006), and this paper responded by examining 
non–North American units. Although the research was not a cross-cultural study per se, the 
relative unimportance of national location has potential implications for future comparative work 
on R&D and managerial discretion. It also suggests the potential international utility of existing 
organization theory. 
 
Beyond clarifying the theories used in this study, future investigation may also usefully 
incorporate other theoretical perspectives (Watson, 2007; Wright & McMahan, 1999). While 
there are many possibilities, among the most promising is the resource-based view of the firm 
(RBV; Barney, 1991). The RBV is already at the heart of many explanations linking HRM to 
performance (Allen & Wright, 2007; Barney & Wright, 1998). Moreover, because this study’s 
findings suggest that ecology theory and strategic choice theory offer the most potential insight 
for understanding HRM outcomes, the RBV’s previous success in blending economic and 
strategic perspectives (Barney, 1991; Jackson & Schuler, 1999) makes it a logical next step in 




The data used in this study have limitations that must be kept in mind when drawing conclusions 
from the results. Most important, the data were cross-sectional, meaning that cause cannot be 
proven. Alternative interpretations could apply. For example, ecology theory predicts that larger 
units enjoy better performance because small units have fewer resources, miss economies of 
scale, and have less of the stable predictability preferred by environmental selection. Consistent 
with this prediction, unit size and performance were positively related. However, because the 
data were cross-sectional, the positive association could have resulted from opposite causality: 
Units that performed well may have attracted more resources and been able to grow as a result. 
Because of data limitations, the current analysis cannot distinguish between these two possible 
explanations. Longitudinal study is thus suggested as a way to distinguish cause from effect. 
 
Another important limitation of this study is its failure to entirely illuminate the black box of 
HRM processes (see Boselie et al., 2005; Wright & McMahan, 1999). The results strongly 
suggest that discretion allows experienced managers to increase unit performance, but this study 
did not measure the exact mechanism by which it does. Strategic management theory suggests 
that the benefit arises from experienced managers deftly responding to unpredictable events, but 
the details of these responses remain uncertain. For example, discretion may allow managers to 
contribute to human capital advantage by giving their staff developmental opportunities or to 
contribute to organizational process advantage by effectively orchestrating their team’s work, or 
both (Boxall, 1998). It will be informative for theory and practice if future studies investigate the 
particular means by which experienced managers use discretion to benefit their units. 
 
Practical Implications and Conclusion 
 
The results of this study have clear practical implications. For one, they serve as a reminder to 
view HRM practices holistically (Wright & McMahan, 1999). Although there has been a 
progression from examining individual policies to focusing on policy bundles, the results here 
suggest that there are important dependencies to consider even among such bundles. For 
example, Subramony’s (2009) review suggested that various empowerment-related practices 
should be viewed as parts of single bundle, and that skill-enhancing practices were similarly best 
conceived as part of a larger whole. As the results here show, however, the effects of 
empowerment (i.e., discretion) likely depend on the prior effects of skill enhancement. As such, 
even at the level of aggregated bundles, HRM policies should probably not be considered 
independent. The best HRM approach will implement an integrated series of practices that 
recognize and use the connections among policies. The other striking implication of these results 
is the need for greater caution about increasing middle managers’ discretion. Despite some 
glowing claims about flat organizations, their universal value seems doubtful in light of this 
study’s findings. The results presented here suggest that many managers’ units will not benefit 
from the increased discretion of flat organizing. As such, a rush to flatten organizational forms 
may produce poor overall results. If it fails to take the contingencies of structure and experience 
into account, flatter organizing may simply cause the rich to get richer, because organizations 
that are already doing well are more likely to have the experienced managers who reap the most 
benefit from increased discretion. 
 
It seems preferable to take a more sober view of increased discretion. Rather than more 
discretion everywhere and always, organizations would do better to focus on creating 
environments and workforces in which discretion will be beneficial. This implies adopting not 
only the holistic, integrated approach to HRM policy mentioned (e.g., Werbel & DeMarie, 2005; 
Wright & Snell, 1998), but also the need to intentionally develop experienced managers. The 
results of this study’s test of organization theory suggest that middle managers without sufficient 
experience will not be able to use their discretion effectively. 
 
Given that leadership development is meant to prepare individuals to guide others effectively, the 
results presented here underscore the importance of including managerial experience as a part of 
leadership development. Job rotation and other experience-based practices would seem useful. 
The most important element, however, in capitalizing on the findings reported here is likely to be 
mentoring. Rather than giving an inexperienced manager discretion that produces little value, it 
might be better to have that manager propose what should be done in a discretionary moment, 
and then have a process for that manager to get feedback on the proposal from a more 
experienced manager. This would be less work than actually managing for the experienced 
employee and still leverage his or her experience, while allowing the inexperienced manager to 
gain experience. The organization would thus enjoy the best of both worlds, with current 
experience using discretion to benefit the organization and developing greater experience for 
future use. 
 
With training in place, the obvious next question is how one should influence a middle 
manager’s level of discretion. Although the focus here was on the consequences of discretion 
(rather than its origins), the use of ecology theory revealed organizational structure as an 
important source of middle managers’ discretion (also see Huang, 2000; Lawler, Mohrman, & 
Ledford, 1992). Similarly, looking at the matter from an agency theory perspective, it may be 
that expertise contributes to discretion by creating greater information asymmetry between 
principal and agent. As such, it seems an important next step to systematically investigate the 
antecedents of managerial discretion. In addition, useful insight is likely to result from more 
precisely defining the scope of a manager’s discretion. This study used a general measure of 
discretion, but intuition and evidence suggest that individuals have varying degrees of discretion 
in different work domains, and such differences are likely to be consequential (e.g., Aghion & 
Tirole, 1997; Caza, 2008). 
 
Given the demonstrated practical and theoretical importance of middle managers’ discretion, it 
seems that a better understanding of the phenomenon is in order. Now that we know middle 
managers’ discretion does matter, we need to understand better how that discretion arises. This 
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